Alung technologies, inc.Manufactures the hemolung ras and catheter.The incident occurred in stevenage, united kingdom.It was reported that during therapy, staff experienced a critical 102 error.The controller responded appropriately by stopping the blood pump.Customer service was provided in which they advised to disconnect the o2, restart the controller, and evaluate the circuit.However, after inspecting the circuit, the physician felt it was unsafe to attempt to restart therapy.Customer support was provided through ending therapy.The patient was assessed the following day and the site staff confirmed the patient was seemingly unaffected by the issue with the control.Following the discontinuation of therapy, a replacement controller was installed and testing without issue.Site staff was satisfied with the support provided and the equipment replacement.The removed cr4 controller was returned to avensys for repair.Through review of the data log, it was determined that there was a leak from the oxygen sweep gas.This controller was recertified, with tubings replaced, and passed all testing without issue.The data log from therapy has been retrieved and reviewed by both clinical and software engineering staff.No abnormalities were noted within the co2 removal and blood flow graphs.Therapy was provided as intended.Site staff was satisfied with the support provided and there were no clinical complications reported as to have occurred as a result of the alarm.No capa was opened because of this event.Examination of the controller data log shows that therapy was provided as intended.Alung technologies, inc.Will continue to monitor any issues as they are reported.This mdr is being filed in response to a retrospective view of all alung technologies, inc.Complaints, which identified that the reporting decision for this complaint was not correct.This mdr is being filed retrospectively to correct the error in the reporting decision.
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Alung technologies, inc.Received a report that during eua hemolung therapy, staff experienced a critical 102 error.The controller responded appropriately by stopping the blood pump.Customer service was provided in which they advised to disconnect the o2, restart the controller, and evaluate the circuit.However, after inspecting the circuit, the physician felt it was unsafe to attempt to restart therapy.Customer support was provided through ending therapy.The patient was assessed the following day and the site staff confirmed the patient was seemingly unaffected by the issue with the control.
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