A dräger service engineer has examined the device on-site.Log file review showed that the device must have been used further since the entries for the period in question were overwritten with newer data already.Among this newer data further entries indicating a safety shut-down of automatic ventilation can be found whereupon the reported issue could be confirmed.The engineer has run the automatic power-on self-test which has not been completed successfully; the section for the ventilator referentiation was not passed.The board which controls the ventilator supervision functions as well as the ventilator motor were replaced as a precautionary measure; the device passed all tests afterwards and was returned to use.The parts were returned to the manufacturer for evaluation and installed into the periphery of a lab device, the reported issue however could not be duplicated.A safety shut-down of automatic ventilation may be forced by the system autonomously to protect the patient from potentially hazardous output.The triggering conditions may be multiple and are not necessarily related to malfunctions.For example, if the patient is coughing against a piston hub applied by the ventilator, this may result in a fast and high rise of the airway pressure upon which the system reacts with a shut-down of automatic ventilation.If the sensor that monitors the airway pressure fails or if the piston position detection system is errorneous, ventilation will be shut-down as well.The shut-down is accompanied by a corresponding alarm; manual ventilation including gas dosage and the monitoring functionalities remain unaffected.Dräger concludes that the device responded as designed upon a deviation of unknown origin; the exact rigger for the safety shut-down could not be determined.A sporadic malfunction of the cylinder pressure sensor due to ingress of humidity would be a plausible explanation; the humidity will evaporate over time and the effects are not present anymore in later evaluations.
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