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As reported, during a left lower extremity angiogram a flexor raabe guiding sheath leaked from the check-flo valve.The user initially used a 0.035 wire then switched to a 0.018 wire.It was initially thought the wire was causing the leak, but the device was still leaking after the wires had been removed.The user had also advanced a balloon, catheter, and atherectomy device through the sheath.The procedure was reported to have been completed successfully.No portion of the device was left within the patient.There was no need for additional procedures or prolonged hospitalization.No adverse effects to the patient occurred due to the reported malfunction.
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Event description: as reported, during a left lower extremity angiogram a flexor raabe guiding sheath leaked from the check-flo valve.The user initially used a 0.035 wire then switched to a 0.018 wire.It was initially thought the wire was causing the leak, but the device was still leaking after the wires had been removed.The user had also advanced a balloon, catheter, and atherectomy device through the sheath.The procedure was reported to have been completed successfully.No portion of the device was left within the patient.There was no need for additional procedures or prolonged hospitalization.No adverse effects to the patient occurred due to the reported malfunction.Investigation ¿ evaluation: a visual inspection of the returned device was conducted.A document based investigation was also performed including a review of complaint history, device history record (dhr), manufacturing instructions, the instructions for use (ifu), and quality control data.One used flexor raabe guiding sheath was returned for investigation.A kink was noted at approximately 26.5cm from the distal end of the white cap.Leakage was noted coming from the silicone disc in the check flo valve.A review of the device history record found one relevant non-conformance for failed leakage test in ten devices, all of which were scrapped.A review of complaint history records shows no other complaints associated with the complaint device lot.Although there were non-conformances relevant to the reported failure mode, all non-conforming product was scrapped, there are 100% inspections to capture this non-conformance.Adequate inspection activities have been established, there is objective evidence that the dhr was fully executed, and no other lot related complaints that have been received from the field, it was concluded that there is no evidence that non-conforming product exists in house or in the field.A review of relevant manufacturing and quality control documents was conducted.Cook has concluded that sufficient inspection activities are in place to identify this failure mode prior to distribution.The instructions for use (ifu), provides the following information to the user related to the reported failure mode: ¿precautions¿ ¿in order to ensure device compatibility, choose a sheath size large enough to accommodate the maximum outer diameter of any devices that will be placed through the sheath.¿ ¿all interventional or diagnostic instruments used with this product should move freely through the valve and sheath to avoid damage.¿ ¿instructions for use¿ sheath introduction 1.Ensure that the inner diameter (id) of the sheath is appropriate for the maximum diameter of the instruments to be introduced.2.Using the side-arm of the valve, flush the sheath by filling the sheath assembly completely with heparinized saline.3.Flush the dilator with heparinized saline.¿sheath removal¿ ¿insert a wire guide until its tip extends at least 10cm past the tip of the sheath.¿ ¿remove the sheath.Avoid applying traction to the hub during removal.If resistance is anticipated or encountered during withdrawal of the flexor sheath, consider reinserting the dilator and removing the sheath and dilator as a unit.¿ ¿remove the wire guide.¿ ¿how supplied¿ upon removal from package, inspect the product to ensure no damage has occurred.Cook has concluded a component failure contributed to this failure mode.There is no evidence that the device was manufactured out of specification.The risk analysis for this failure mode was reviewed, and it was determined that no actions are required.The appropriate personnel have been notified, and we will continue to monitor for similar complaints.This report is required by the fda under 21 cfr part 803.This report is based on unconfirmed information submitted by others.Neither the submission of this report nor any statement made in it is intended to be an admission that any cook device is defective or malfunctioned; that a death or serious injury occurred; or that any cook device caused or contributed to; or is likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if a malfunction occurred.
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