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This report includes information known at this time.A follow-up report will be submitted should additional relevant information become available.This report is required by the fda under 21 cfr part 803 and is based on unconfirmed information submitted by others.Neither the submission of this report nor any statement contained herein is intended to be an admission that any cook device is defective or malfunctioned, that a death or serious injury occurred, nor that any cook device caused, contributed to, or is likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if a malfunction occurred.
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Summary of event: as reported, during an unspecified procedure, the hub of the flexor raabe guiding sheath came off.A section of the device did not remain inside the patient.The patient did not experience any adverse effects or require any additional procedures due to this occurrence.Investigation evaluation: reviews of the complaint history, device history record (dhr), instructions for use (ifu), manufacturing instructions, and quality control procedures were conducted during the investigation.A visual inspection was conducted as well.The complaint device was returned to cook for investigation.The sheath had pulled free from the hub, and there was no sheath material was noted in the hub.A document-based investigation evaluation was performed.A review of the device history record found one possible relevant non-conformance for a damaged fitting; however, this step is checked 100% during the quality control process and all nonconforming product has been scrapped.A database search for complaints on the reported lot found no additional complaints reported from the field.Cook concluded that no nonconforming product from this lot exists in house or in the field.The product ifu states ¿warnings: if resistance is encountered during advancement of flexor sheath, assess cause of resistance, and consider dilation of any restriction identified or consider alternate treatment strategy.If flexor sheath is advanced through resistance, force to remove the sheath will be higher, increasing the risk of sheath material or hub separation upon withdrawal.Reinsertion of dilator prior to removal of flexor sheath increases the strength of the sheath and lessens the risk of device separation.If resistance i anticipated or encountered during withdrawal of flexor sheath, consider carefully reinserting the dilator prior to continuing removal.Precautions: in order to ensure device compatibility, choose a sheath size large enough to accommodate the maximum outer diameter of any devices that will be placed through the sheath.All interventional or diagnostic instruments used with this product should move freely through the valve and sheath to avoid damage.Sheath removal 1.Insert a wire guide until its tip extends at least 10cm past the tip of the sheath.2.Remove the sheath.Avoid applying traction to the hub during removal.If resistance is anticipated or encountered during withdrawal of the flexor sheath, consider reinserting the dilator and removing the sheath and dilator as a unit.3.Remove the wire guide.¿ a review of the device master record (dmr) concluded that sufficient inspection activities are in place to identify this failure mode prior to distribution.The information provided upon review of the dmr, dhr, ifu, returned device, and complaint file suggests that there is evidence the device was manufactured to specification.There is no evidence of non-conforming devices in-house or in the field.Although one possible relevant non-conformance was noted on the lot, all non-conforming product was scrapped, there are 100% inspections in place to capture this non-conformance, adequate inspection activities have been established, there is objective evidence that the dhr was fully executed, and no other lot-related complaints have been received from the field.Therefore, it was concluded that there is no evidence that additional non-conforming product exists in house or in the field.Based on the information provided and the results of the investigation, cook has concluded that component failure unrelated to manufacturing or design deficiencies contributed to this incident.The risk analysis for this failure mode was reviewed and no additional escalation was required.The appropriate personnel have been notified and cook will continue to monitor for similar events.This report is required by the fda under 21 cfr part 803 and is based on unconfirmed information submitted by others.Neither the submission of this report nor any statement contained herein is intended to be an admission that any cook device is defective or malfunctioned, that a death or serious injury occurred, nor that any cook device caused, contributed to, or is likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if a malfunction occurred.
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