The device was not returned edwards lifesciences for evaluation, as it was discarded at the facility.In this particular case, despite multiple investigational attempts, it was not possible to obtain additional details regarding the reported event.Additional information is not forthcoming.A review of the device history records (dhr) and lot history could not be performed because the lot number information is not available.During manufacturing, the delivery system undergoes multiple inspections and testing including: balloon 100% inspection for working length, balloon diameter, proximal and distal leg id, proximal leg od, double wall thickness, and for mechanical damage and deformation.The crimp balloon is 100% inspected for balloon distal and proximal id, wall thickness and defects.The flex tip od is inspected.The balloon size is inspected for balloon size and distorted/pinched folds.100% functional inspection and visual inspections are performed during final inspection. in addition, the commander delivery system undergoes functional product verification testing on a sampling basis, including retrieval force of system through sheath, and locknut/collect engagement tensile testing.These inspections during the manufacturing process support that it is unlikely a manufacturing non-conformance contributed to the reported complaint event.A review of edwards lifesciences risk management documentation was performed for this case. the reported event is an anticipated risk of the transcatheter heart valve procedure, additional assessment of the failure mode is not required at this time.Due to the unavailability of the device or any relevant imagery for this specific complaint, the complaint of difficulties during withdrawal was unable to be confirmed.Since applicable devices were not returned, engineering was unable to perform any visual, functional, or dimensional analysis.As a result, it cannot be determined if a manufacturing non-conformance contributed to the complaint event.However, a review of complaint history and manufacturing processes revealed that it is unlikely a manufacturing issue contributed to the complaint.Additionally, a review of ifu/training manuals revealed no deficiencies.Although no imagery for this case was available, imagery from a possibly similar case was provided.In the imagery, it was shown that the flex tip was over the triple marker during valve deployment.However, after retrieval, the flex tip was pushing against the proximal balloon taper.It is unknown if the delivery system was retrieved with the flex tip over the balloon, or if the balloon shaft slipped during retrieval, causing the flex tip to push up against the balloon.The following scenarios could have occurred to cause the balloon shaft to slip: the balloon shaft was not fully locked and thus slipped during removal.Per the training manuals, the flex tip should be positioned over the triple marker and the balloon shaft should be locked prior to removal.The device was locked, but the balloon shaft slipped during removal.It is possible that, if the balloon shaft is being pulled on for delivery system withdrawal, the balloon shaft could have slipped while the flex tip was passing through the seals of the esheath (as this would have provided additional resistance/force during withdrawal). if the balloon shaft slipped, resulting in the flex tip being pushed up against the balloon before the device was withdrawn into the esheath, this could have potentially led to an enlarged flex tip profile and contributed to the reported event.However, based on available information, a definite root cause is unable to be determined at this time. review of complaint history revealed that the occurrence rate did not exceed the march 2018 control limit for the applicable trend category.Since no manufacturing non-conformances, labeling, training, or ifu deficiencies were identified, no corrective or preventative action is required at this time.
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